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5.1 Overview
The world economy has become far more unequal over the last two cen-
turies. Within-country income inequality has risen and fallen episodically.
It has often risen in developing countries, although not always. It has fallen
in the developed and industrialized countries, although this trend has re-
cently reversed in some parts of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD). Thus, there is no ubiquitous trend in
within-country inequality over the past two centuries. It follows that virtu-
ally all the observed rise in world income inequality has been driven by
widening gaps between nations, and almost none of it has been driven by
widening gaps within nations. Meanwhile, the world economy has become
much more integrated. If correlation meant causation, these facts would
imply that globalization has raised inequality between all nations but that it
has not raised inequality within nations.
This essay argues that the likely impact of globalization on world in-
equality has been very diﬀerent from what these simple correlations sug-
gest. Globalization probably mitigated the steep rise in income gaps be-
tween nations. The nations that gained the most from globalization are
5
Does Globalization Make the World
More Unequal?
Peter H. Lindert and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson
Peter H. Lindert is professor of economics at the University of California, Davis. Jeﬀrey G.
Williamson is the Laird Bell Professor of Economics at Harvard University and a research as-
sociate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The authors thank François Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson for the chance to use
prepublication estimates from their ongoing work on global inequalities. They also acknowl-
edge with thanks the detailed comments of Alan Taylor on earlier drafts, discussions with
David Dollar and Andy Warner, and comments made by participants at the NBER Global-
ization in Historical Perspective conference. Williamson gratefully acknowledges the ﬁnancial
support of the National Science Foundation SES-0001362.those poor ones that changed their policies to exploit it, whereas the ones
that gained the least did not. The eﬀect of globalization on inequality within
nations has gone both ways, and not according to any simple correlation be-
tween the observed trends, or, for that matter, according to any simple the-
ory.
The economic history of inequality suggests the following ﬁve conclu-
sions about the inﬂuence of globalization:
1. The dramatic widening of income gaps between nations has probably
been reduced, not raised, by the globalization of commodity and factor
markets, at least for those countries that integrated into the world economy.
2. Within labor-abundant countries before 1914, opening up to interna-
tional trade and to international factor movements lowered inequality, a
powerful eﬀect when and where emigration was massive.
3. Within labor-scarce countries, opening up to international trade and
to international factor movements raised inequality, a powerful eﬀect be-
fore 1914 where immigration was massive. Globalization also raised in-
equality in the postwar OECD, but it was not the main source of widening,
partly because immigration was not massive either.
4. All international and intranational eﬀects considered, more global-
ization has meant less world inequality.
5. World incomes would still be unequal under complete global integra-
tion, as they are in any large integrated national economy. But they would
be less unequal in a fully integrated world economy than in one fully seg-
mented.
This essay will reach these ﬁve conclusions by exploring four dimensions:
the components of world inequality, the sources of globalization, the degree
to which individual nations actually globalized, and the historical time pe-
riod.
The two key components of world inequality—inequality between country
average incomes, and inequality within countries—must be treated sepa-
rately. Inequality between nations calls for attention to the determinants of
per capita incomes. Inequality within countries calls for attention to the de-
terminants of factor prices and their link to the size distribution of income.
Even more importantly, international and intranational inequalities have
very diﬀerent implications for policy responses, and thus they demand sep-
arate attention. Changing world inequality induced by a changing distribu-
tion of population between countries also has diﬀerent implications for pol-
icy, especially if induced by world migration. Finally, which components of
world inequality matter most depends on whether observers care as much
about the rest of the world as they care about their own citizens. This essay
takes the global stance, but we warn again that national policies derive from
national attitudes toward intranational globalization eﬀects.
Diﬀerent sources of globalizationhave diﬀerent impacts on inequality. Po-
228 Peter H. Lindert and Jeﬀrey G. Williamsonlitical debate over globalization implicitly poses an alternative in which lib-
eral policy is replaced by barriers to trade and factor migration. Yet global-
ization in the past has been driven mostly by forces unrelated to policy, such
as productivity improvements, rising potential gains from specialization,
and transport revolutions, each of which may have very diﬀerent implica-
tions for the distribution of world income compared with policy changes.
Even when history oﬀers examples of globalization due to more liberal poli-
cies, it matters who did the liberalizing. 
Identical globalization events had very diﬀerent eﬀects on participants
and non-participants. What globalization does to the inequality among par-
ticipating countries is quite diﬀerent from what it does to inequality among
all nations. Controlling for other forces, we ﬁnd clear signs of income con-
vergence among countries that integrate more fully into the world economy,
but divergence between these active participants and those who remain
insulated from global markets. Among those participating in global mar-
kets, the already advanced countries, the regions of new settlement (Euro-
pean and otherwise), and the rest all experienced diﬀerent eﬀects: The gains
from trade diﬀered, the contribution of across-border factor ﬂows diﬀered,
and the impact on their income distributions diﬀered.
The historical record is divided into four distinctly diﬀerent epochs: the
pre-industrial years prior to the 1820s; the long nineteenth century from the
1820s to World War I; the two world wars and the unstable years in between;
and the second half of the twentieth century. The ﬁrst was a long preglob-
alization epoch in which factor ﬂows were slight and long-distance trade
was monopolized and mostly limited to luxuries. The second and fourth
epochs contained worldwide surges in global integration. The third epoch
witnessed a ubiquitous retreat from globalization into economic autarky. 
5.2 Global Divergence Is Far Older than Globalization
To understand the long-run movements in world inequality and global-
ization, it is useful to begin by standing at the 1820s1 watershed to survey
the earlier and later trends from that vantage point.
From the 1820s onwards, there are better data on world inequality and
world market integration. These data document some key facts. Fact num-
ber 1 is that all recent estimates ﬁnd a dramatic income divergence around
the globe over the past two centuries. Furthermore, they all show that this
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1. The 1820s represent a dating compromise. The decade is adopted in part to coincide with
the peacetime recovery from the Napoleonic Wars on the Continent and an agricultural de-
pression (i.e., structural adjustment) in Great Britain. The decade also serves as a link to Mad-
dison’s (1995) estimates for 1820 in his study of the world economy. Most important, however,
the decade is consistent with the evidence put forth by O’Rourke and Williamson (2000) show-
ing that international commodity price convergence did not start until then, and that a pow-
erful and epochal move toward liberal policy (e.g., dismantling mercantilism) was manifested
during that decade as well, at least in Great Britain.divergence has been driven almost entirely by the rise of between-nation in-
equality, not by any rise in inequality within nations (Berry, Bourguignon,
and Morrisson, 1983, 1991; Maddison 1995; Pritchett 1997; Prados de la
Escosura, 2000; Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002; Ward 2000).2 This evi-
dence is summarized in ﬁgure 5.1. Fact number 2 is that, since the 1820s,
there has also been an impressive worldwide increase in commodity and
factor market integration, despite the temporary and disastrous retreat dur-
ing the world wars and the troubled era in between (Williamson 1995, 1996;
Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin, 1999; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999).
This evidence is summarized in table 5.1.
The centuries before 1820 oﬀer two additional stylized facts. Fact number
3is that income gaps almost certainly widened from 1600 or even earlier. As
best we can judge from indicators of real wages, real land rents, returns to
capital, and the occasional direct tax returns in the more literate countries,
the early modern “great divergence” was true in all dimensions—globally
andbetween European nations and within European nations. At the global
level, real wages in England and Holland pulled away from the rest of the
world in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century (van Zanden 1999;
Pomeranz 2000; Allen 2000, 2001). Furthermore, the landed, merchant,
and protomanufacturing classes of England, Holland, and France pulled
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2. The rise in global income inequality from 1820 to 1950 illustrated in ﬁgure 5.1 has not
been debated, but there is some disagreement about the experience since 1950. Although the
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) data in ﬁgure 5.1 have the increase in global inequality and
inequality between nations decelerating after 1950, the data in Melchior, Telle, and Wiig (2000)
actually have the inequality between countries falling after 1960. We shall have more to say
about this epochal regime switch later.
Fig. 5.1 Global inequality of individual incomes, 1820–1992
Source: Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002).
Notes: The “countries” here consist of ﬁfteen single countries with abundant data and large
populations, plus eighteen other country groups. The eighteen groups were aggregates of geo-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.far ahead of everyone—their compatriots, the rest of Europe, and probably
any nation in the world—between the sixteenth and the eighteenth cen-
turies. This divergence was even greater in real than in nominal terms, be-
cause luxuries became much cheaper relative to staples (van Zanden 1995;
Hoﬀman et al. 2002; Pamuk 2000). Although we still lack estimates or even
guesstimates on the world distribution of income between 1500 and 1820,
the bits and pieces we do have suggest that global inequality must have risen
signiﬁcantly in this pre-industrial era.
Fact number 4 is that there was no great march toward globalization af-
ter the 1490s and the voyages of de Gama and Columbus, despite the rhet-
oric about an early modern “world system.” Granted, the early voyages
made spice price markups a little less astronomical than in the days when
the Arabs and Venetians monopolized long-distance trade. Yet there was no
further progress toward price convergence in spices or any other long-
distance tradable in the three centuries from the early and mid-1500s to the
1820s (O’Rourke and Williamson 2000, 2002; Findlay and O’Rourke, ch. 1
in this volume). Intercontinental trade remained eﬀectively monopolized,
and huge price markups between exporting and importing ports were main-
tained even in the face of improving transport technology.3 Furthermore,
most of the traded commodities were noncompeting. That is, they were not
produced at home and thus did not displace some competing domestic in-
dustry. In addition, these traded consumption goods were luxuries out of
reach of the vast majority of each trading country’s population. In short,
pre-1820 trade had only a trivial impact on living standards of anyone but
the very rich.4Finally, the migration of people and capital was only a trickle
before the 1820s. True globalization began only after the 1820s.
These four facts imply the following conﬂict: Although global divergence
has been, to use Pritchett’s (1997) phrase, “big time” for at least 400 years,
globalization has been a fact of life for only about 150 (from about 1820, but
omitting the autarkic retreat in 1914–45). This conﬂict certainly raises ini-
tial doubts about the common premise that rising world integration is
responsible for rising world inequality.5
232 Peter H. Lindert and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson
3. Although the existence of multilateral trade helped harmonize price movements within
Europe (Jacks 2000), price gaps remained wide, even for grains, which were the most traded
goods in a highly segmented Europe. See Abel (1973, 315, and tables 1 and 2) on the geography
of wheat prices in grams of silver. At the local level, overland transport costs were typically
higher than in the international sea trade, causing large markups over short distances. Another
factor holding up grain trade integration between 1765 and the 1820s was the combination of
the peacetime Corn Laws and the wartime Continental blockade.
4. For all the trade involving silver, its ability to buy grains or textiles remained far greater
in Asia or even Eastern Europe than in the Americas, where the silver was mined, or in West-
ern Europe. See O’Rourke and Williamson (2000) and Allen (2000) on Asia versus Europe,
and Braudel and Spooner (1966), Allen (2001), and van Zanden (1999) on silver prices within
Europe.
5. It should be added that, with the exception of sixteenth-century Spain, the countries that
pulled ahead between 1500 and 1820 did not do so on the basis of their gains from overseas
trade and empire, as quantitative studies have shown (e.g., Eltis and Engerman 2000).5.3 The First Globalization Boom, 1820–1914
Table 5.1 sketches the integration of world commodity and factor mar-
kets during the ﬁrst great globalization boom and contrasts it with
antiglobal trends after the start of World War I. Regarding trade and com-
modity markets, the liberal dismantling of mercantilism and the worldwide
transport revolution worked together to produce truly global markets
across the nineteenth century. Almost three-quarters of the commodity
price convergence was due to declining transport costs, and a little more
than a quarter was due to the liberal policy switch.6Although the decline in
transport costs continued throughout the century, there was an antiglobal-
ization policy reaction only after 1870, and it was nowhere near big enough
to cause a return to the 1820 levels of economic isolation. Mass migration
remained free, although immigrant subsidies had evaporated by the end of
the century. As European investors came to believe in strong growth
prospects overseas, global capital markets also became steadily more inte-
grated, reaching levels in 1913 that may not yet have been regained even to-
day. On all three fronts these pre-1914 globalization achievements were sub-
sequently reversed, and then renewed after 1950.
5.3.1 Which Nations Gained Most from Trade? Terms-of-Trade Clues
Terms-of-trade movements might oﬀer some clues regarding who gains
most from trade, and a literature at least two centuries old has oﬀered opin-
ions about whose terms of trade should improve most and why.7 Classical
economists thought the relative price of primary products should rise given
an inelastic supply of land and natural resources. This classical conven-
tional wisdom took a revisionist U-turn in the 1950s when Hans Singer and
Raoul Prebisch argued that the terms of trade had deteriorated for poor
countries in the periphery, exporting primary products, while they had im-
proved for rich countries in the center, exporting industrial products.
The terms of trade can be inﬂuenced by a decline in transport costs, in
which case everybody’s terms of trade can improve. They can also be inﬂu-
enced by policy and by other events, such as intercommodity diﬀerences in
productivity growth rates, demand elasticities, and factor supply responses.
Since transport costs declined sharply in the century following 1820, this is
one likely source that served to raise everybody’s terms of trade. Further-
more, and as we shall see in a moment, rich countries like Great Britain
took a terms-of-trade hit when they switched to free trade by midcentury,
an event that must have raised the terms of trade in the poor, nonindustrial
periphery even more. But in some parts of the periphery, especially before
the 1870s, other factors were at work that mattered even more.
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6. The relative contribution of the liberal policy switch between the 1770s and the 1820s, as-
sociated with rejecting mercantilism, was, of course, far bigger.
7. See the survey in Diakosavvas and Scandizzo (1991) or Hadass and Williamson (2001).Probably the greatest nineteenth-century globalization shock did not in-
volve transport revolutions at all. It happened in Asia, and it happened
shortly before 1870. Under the persuasion of American gunships, Japan
switched from virtual autarky to free trade in 1858. It is hard to imagine a
more dramatic switch from closed to open trade policy. In the ﬁfteen years
following 1858, Japan’s foreign trade rose seventy times, from virtually nil
to 7 percent of national income (Huber 1971). The prices of exportables
soared, rising toward world market levels. The prices of importables
slumped, falling toward world market levels. One researcher estimates that,
as a consequence, Japan’s terms of trade rose by a factor of 3.5 between 1858
and the early 1870s (Huber 1971). Another thinks the rise was even bigger,
a factor of 4.9 between 1857 and 1875 (Yasuba 1996). Whichever estimate
one accepts, the combination of declining transport costs and a dramatic
switch from autarky to free trade unleashed a powerful terms-of-trade gain
for Japan.
Other Asian nations followed this liberal path, most forced to do so by
colonial dominance or gunboat diplomacy. Thus, China signed a treaty in
1842 opening her ports to trade and adopting a 5 percent ad valorem tariﬀ
limit. Siam adopted a 3 percent tariﬀ limit in 1855. Korea emerged from its
autarkic “hermit kingdom” a little later (with the Treaty of Kangwha in
1876), undergoing market integration with Japan long before colonial sta-
tus became formalized in 1910. India went the way of British free trade in
1846, and Indonesia mimicked Dutch liberalism. In short, and whether
they liked it or not, prior to 1870 the most important part of the periphery
underwent tremendous improvements in their terms of trade by this policy
switch, and it was reinforced by declining transport costs worldwide.
For the years after 1870, we have good evidence documenting terms-of-
trade movements the world around (Williamson 2002, table 2). Contrary to
the assertions of Prebisch and Singer, not only did the terms of trade im-
prove for the poor periphery8 up to World War I, but they improved a lot
more than they did in Europe. Over the four decades prior to World War I,
the terms of trade rose by only 2 percent in the European center, by almost
10 percent in East Asia, and by more than 21 percent in the rest of the third
world.
These pre–World War I terms-of-trade clues seem to imply that global-
ization favored the poor periphery more than it did the center, and thus that
globalization contained leveling forces. The inference may be false.
Over the short run, positive and quasi-permanent terms-of-trade shocks
of foreign origin will always (ceteris paribus) raise a nation’s purchasing
power, and the empirical issue is only how much. If the export sector was
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8. In the study cited (Williamson 2002), the poor periphery sample includes Burma, Egypt,
India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The rich (New World) periphery sample includes
Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United States, and Uruguay. The Europe center sample in-
cludes Great Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and Sweden.one-ﬁfth of gross domestic product (GDP; a very large share by the stan-
dards of that time), and if the terms of trade improved by 5 percent over a
decade (a pretty big relative price shock, as we have seen), then the pur-
chasing power of GDP would have been raised by about 0.1 percentage
points a year, a pretty small bang even if the country was growing at only 1
or 2 percent per annum.
Over the long run a positive terms-of-trade shock in primary-product-
producing countries could reinforce comparative advantage, pull resources
into the export sector from other activities, and cause deindustrialization.
To the extent that industrialization is the prime carrier of capital-deepening
and technological change, then economists like Hans Singer are right to
caution that positive external price shocks for primary producers may ac-
tually lower growth rates in the long run. As far as we know, nobody has yet
tried to decompose the short-run and long-run components of terms-of-
trade shocks like these. But there has been a recent eﬀort to explore the pos-
sibility that a positive change in the terms of trade could have had a nega-
tive long-run eﬀect around the periphery.9
5.3.2 Trade Expansion and the Within-Country Distribution of Income
The standard Stolper-Samuelson prediction is that free trade increases
incomes for the abundant factor and reduces incomes for the scarce factor.
Protection has the opposite eﬀect, and what holds for trade policy also
holds for transport costs. In a simple world where labor works the land, and
where each country takes world commodity prices as given, any move to-
ward the globalization of commodity markets through trade and commod-
ity price convergence should favor incomes of the laboring poor in the poor-
est trading partners where labor is abundant and land is scarce. Conversely,
it should favor incomes of the landed rich in the richest trading partners
where labor is scarce and land is abundant. But suppose there are more fac-
tors of production than just land and labor, and suppose some countries
have an impact on their terms of trade. What then? History oﬀers plenty of
competing examples.
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9. Hadass and Williamson (2001). Adding terms-of-trade variables to empirical growth mod-
els in the tradition of Robert Barro, Jeﬀrey Sachs, and many others (Barro and Sala-i-Martin
1995; Sachs and Warner 1995), and estimating for a panel of nineteen countries between 1870
and 1940, yields the result that an improvement in terms of trade augmented growth in the
center. That is, the coeﬃcient on terms-of-trade growth in the center is positive and signiﬁcant
in a GDP per capita growth regression. However, the same positive terms-of-trade shock
wasg rowth-reducing in the periphery. It appears that the short-run gain from an improving
terms of trade was overwhelmed by a long-run loss attributed to deindustrialization in the
periphery; in the center, in contrast, the short-run gain was reinforced by a long-run gain
attributed to industrialization. Thus, it looks like terms-of-trade shocks before World War I
were serving to augment the growing gap between rich and poor nations, with globalization
adding to divergence. However, terms-of-trade shocks were rarely big enough to change GDP
per capita growth rates by more than 5 or 10 percent (e.g., from 2 to 2.1 or 2.2 percent per
annum).Great Britain’s nineteenth-century free-trade leadership, especially its
famous Corn Law repeal in 1846, oﬀers a good illustration of how the
eﬀects of liberalization depend on its sources, and how the eﬀects of glob-
alization can be egalitarian both at the world level and within the liberaliz-
ing advanced country. Was this a redistribution toward the British rich and
away from the British poor, as well as from the rest of the world, as some of
today’s rhetoric would insist? No, the most likely redistributive eﬀects were
just the opposite. The big gainers from this leading-country trade liberal-
ization were British laborers and the rest of the world, while the clear losers
were British landlords, the world’s richest group. How much the rest of the
world gained (and whether British capitalists gained at all) depended on
foreign-trade elasticities and induced terms-of-trade eﬀects, assessments
that pitted David Ricardo against Robert Torrens. But since these terms-of-
trade eﬀects were probably quite signiﬁcant for what then was called “the
workshop of the world,” Great Britain must have distributed considerable
gains to the rest of the world as well as to her own workers. British labor
gained because Great Britain was a food-importing country (thus agricul-
ture was a small employer)10 and unskilled labor was used much less inten-
sively in import-competing production than was land.11 British nineteenth-
century experience oﬀers a very diﬀerent example than does the United
States today, as we shall see below. Thus, history oﬀers two enormously im-
portant historical cases in which leading-country trade liberalization had
completely diﬀerent eﬀects: whereas British liberalization in the nineteenth
century was unambiguously egalitarian at both the national and global
level, American liberalization in the twentieth century was not.
There are even better data for exploiting the factor-price approach to the
globalization and inequality connection after 1870, but while we examine
these data remember that international factor migration joined trade as an
important force aﬀecting intranational inequality in the late nineteenth
century. Two kinds of evidence oﬀer hints about inequality trends within
countries participating in the global economy (Williamson 1997). One uses
trends in the ratio of farm rents per acre to unskilled wages (r/w, in ﬁgs. 5.2
and 5.4).12 Ther e nt-wage ratio might be thought of as a measure of how
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10. O’Rourke (1997) has shown that labor would not have gained from free trade on much
of the continent because, among other things, agriculture was a much bigger employer, so that
the employment eﬀects (the nominal wage) dominated the consumption eﬀects (the cost of liv-
ing).
11. See Irwin (1988, 1991) and Williamson (1990). The eﬀects on speciﬁc factor-income
groups within Great Britain are inferred from a computable general-equilibrium model, one
that is outﬁtted with parameters from nineteenth-century Great Britain, and one that is
broadly consistent with observed movements in relative factor prices. The eﬀects on Great
Britain’s terms of trade are estimated econometrically from British time series data.
12. The sources for ﬁgures 5.2–5.5 are O’Rourke, Taylor, and Williamson (1996) and
Williamson (2002). For expositional convenience, this section examines factor-price ratios as
if they were being aﬀected by commodity trade alone, even though the same factor-price move-
ments were aﬀected strongly by the international factor ﬂows to which we will turn next. Thismany days’ labor it would take to pay the rent on a hectare of farmland. It
is a relative factor price whose trends determined inequality movements in
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expositional assumption seems harmless since econometric analysis conﬁrms that both trade
andfactor ﬂows contributed to the movements documented in ﬁgures 5.2–5.5 (O’Rourke, Tay-
lor, and Williamson). We should note that the land “rents” are in fact indexes of farmland pur-
chase prices, not rents, in the case of Australia, Punjab, Sweden, Thailand, and the United
States. The ratio of land purchase value to rental value could have drifted upward due to re-
duction in nominal interest rates. For these countries, the rise in the ratio of land value to wages





Fig. 5.2 Trends in the rent-wage ratio, Europe and the New World, 1870–1939: A,
Initially land-abundant countries; B, Land-scarce free-trade countries; C, Land-
scarce countries protecting grain farmers after 1875
Source: See note 12.a world where the agricultural sector was big and where land was a critical
component of total wealth. It tells us how the typical landlord at the top of
the distribution did relative to the typical unskilled (landless) worker near
the bottom. The other inequality clue from factor prices uses trends in the
ratio of GDP per worker to the unskilled wage rate (v/w, in ﬁgs. 5.3and 5.5).
These tell us how far the recipient of the average income was pulling ahead
of the typical unskilled worker near the bottom.13 We now have this evi-
dence for the Atlantic economy. Figure 5.3 plots trends in y/w, and it is cer-
tainly consistent with the conventional globalization prediction. Inequality
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Fig. 5.3 Trends in a crude inequality indicator, Old and New World, 1870–1939: A,
Initially land-abundant countries; B, Land-scarce free-trade countries
Source: See note 12.
13. Our references to “top,” “middle,” and “bottom” do not mean that the landlords, aver-
age income earners, and unskilled workers occupied ﬁxed percentile positions on the income
spectrum. This assumption would be convenient here, but the data do not allow it.should have been rising in labor-scarce and land-abundant countries either
due to the trade boom raising incomes of the abundant factor (e.g., land,
augmenting incomes of those at the top) or due to a mass immigration low-
ering unskilled wages (e.g., unskilled labor, eroding incomes of those near
the bottom).
A strong link between inequality trends and initial endowment stands
out in ﬁgures 5.2–5.5, and this link bears the clear imprint of a globalization
eﬀect. Our ﬁrst glimpse of the link comes from the contrasting trends for
land-abundant North America and Australia versus land-scarce Europe in
ﬁgure 5.2. In North America and Australia, where land was initially abun-
dant, rents rose relative to unskilled wages before World War I, although
not for the deglobalizing interwar period. The same was true of the initially
land-abundant countries of Latin America and Asia, as shown in ﬁgure 5.4.
By contrast, where land was initially scarce, as in Europe, Japan, Korea,
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Fig. 5.4 Third world trends in rent-wage ratios, 1870–1939: A, Initially land-
abundant countries; B, Land-scarce countries
Source: See note 12.and Taiwan, the rent-wage ratio declined before 1914. Although many fac-
tors were at work, globalization must have played the key role in account-
ing for the sharply contrasting trends between land-abundant and land-
scarce countries, and between globalizing prewar and deglobalizing
interwar periods. We cannot imagine another causal force that by itself
could explain these sharp contrasts in trend between countries and periods,
especially in those where industrialization forces were quiet.
Trends within Europe also betray an important distributional role for
globalization. Note in ﬁgure 5.2 that those who faced the onslaught of
cheap foreign grain after 1870, but decided not to impose high tariﬀs on the
invading grains (Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Sweden), recorded
the biggest loss on rental income for landlords and the biggest gain for
workers. Those who protected their landlords and farmers against cheap
foreign grain after 1875 (France, Germany, and Spain) generally recorded a
smaller decline in land rents relative to unskilled wage rates.
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Fig. 5.5 Third world trends in a crude inequality indicator, 1870–1939: A, Initially
land-abundant countries; B, Land-scarce countries
Source: See note 12.Inequality should have been falling in labor-abundant and land-scarce
European countries, again due to trade booms and mass emigration. That
happened in Scandinavia and Italy. Portugal and Spain did not share these
egalitarian trends, but Iberia was well known for its unwillingness to play
the globalization game. The European industrial leaders fell in the middle,
just as we would predict. They were, after all, industrial and thus had
smaller agricultural sectors. Land was a smaller component of total wealth
in these industrial leaders, and improved incomes for (abundant) capital,
whose capitalist owners were located near the top of the income distribu-
tion, at least partially oﬀset the diminished incomes from land, whose own-
ers tended to be at the top of the income distribution.
Evidence supporting these rent-wage ratio inferences come from the be-
havior of the second crude inequality indicator (y/w) in ﬁgures 5.3 and 5.5.
It rose in the land-abundant countries during the prewar globalization
boom. It declined in the land-scarce countries (with the possible exception
of East Asia between the 1890s and World War I).
The inequality-globalization connection in the nineteenth century can be
summarized this way: Globalization seems to have had an inegalitarian
eﬀect in (initially) land-abundant countries, a force raising inequality by re-
warding landowners more than workers; and globalization seems to have
had an egalitarian eﬀect in (initially) land-scarce countries, especially in
those that stuck with free trade and resisted pleas for protection. These two
eﬀects might appear at ﬁrst glance to cancel each other out when aggregat-
ing up to the Atlantic economy as a whole. But a longer look tips the scales
in favor of net egalitarian eﬀects when we note that European landlords at
the top of the Atlantic income distribution lost the most, while European
unskilled workers at the bottom gained the most. A lot of the rest was
simply New World “churning” in the middle.
5.3.3 The Impact of Factor Migration on 
Between-Country Income Gaps
Mass Migration and Convergence
Real wages and living standards converged among the currently indus-
trialized OECD countries between 1850 and World War I. The convergence
was driven primarily by the erosion of the gap between the New World and
the Old. In addition, many poor European countries were catching up with
the industrial leaders. How much of this convergence was due to mass mi-
gration?14 Although Barry R. Chiswick and Timothy J. Hatton discuss this
question in chapter 2 in this volume, we must treat the issue here too.
Table 5.2 assesses the labor force impact of these migrations on each of
seventeen countries in the Atlantic economy in 1910. The impact varied
greatly. Among receiving countries, Argentina’s labor force was augmented
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.most by immigration (86 percent), Brazil’s the least (4 percent), and the
United States in between (24 percent), the latter below the New World av-
erage of 40 percent. Among sending countries, Ireland’s labor force was di-
minished most by emigration (45 percent), France the least (1 percent), and
Great Britain in between (11 percent), the latter just a little below the Old
World average of 13 percent. At the same time, real wage dispersion in the
Atlantic economy declined between 1870 and 1910 by 28 percent, GDP per
capita dispersion by 18 percent, and GDP per-worker dispersion by 29 per-
cent (table 5.2, bottom). What contribution did the mass migration make to
that measured convergence? To answer this question, we ask another: What
would have been the measured convergence had there been no mass migra-
tion?
Migration aﬀects long-run equilibrium output and wages by inﬂuencing
aggregate labor supply. Taylor and Williamson (1997) estimate labor de-
mand elasticities econometrically and use these results to assess the wage
impact of changing labor supply by country. They also estimated the impact
of migration on GDP per capita and GDP per worker. The last three col-
umns of table 5.2 present their results.
Table 5.2 accords with intuition. In the absence of the mass migrations,
wages and labor productivity would have been a lot higher in the New
World and a lot lower in the Old. In the absence of the mass migrations, in-
come per capita would typically (but not always) have been a bit higher in
the New World and typically (but not always) a bit lower in the Old World.
Not surprisingly, the biggest counterfactual impact is reported for those
countries that experienced the biggest migrations. Emigration raised Irish
wages by 32 percent, Italian by 28 percent, and Norwegian by 10 percent.
Immigration lowered Argentine wages by 22 percent, Australian by 15 per-
cent, Canadian by 16 percent, and American by 8 percent.
This partial equilibrium assessment of migration’s impact is higher than
a general equilibrium assessment would be. After all, it ignores trade re-
sponses and changes in output mix, both of which would have muted the
impact of migration. It also ignores global capital market responses, al-
though this latter shortcoming will be repaired in a moment. Whether an
overstatement or not, table 5.2 certainly lends strong support to the hy-
pothesis that mass migration made an important contribution to late-
nineteenth-century convergence. In the absence of the mass migrations, real
wage dispersion would have increased by 7 percent, rather than decreasing
by 28 percent, as in fact it did (table 5.2, bottom panel). Gross domestic
product per-worker dispersion would have decreased by only 9 percent,
rather than by 29 percent, as in fact it did. GDP per capita dispersion would
also have decreased by only 9 percent, rather than by 18 percent as in fact
it did. Wage gaps between New World and Old in fact declined from 108 to
85 percent, but in the absence of the mass migrations they would have risen
to 128 percent in 1910.
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clude that for 1870–1910 migration can account for all of the real wage con-
vergence, about two-thirds of the GDP-per-worker convergence, and per-
haps one-half of the GDP per capita convergence.15
The relative insensitivity of GDP per capita convergence to migration is
a result of countervailing eﬀects. Mass migration self-selected young adults.
Thus, high migrant labor participation rates ampliﬁed the impact of migra-
tion on real wages and GDP per worker, but the eﬀect on GDP per capita
was muted. Why? For wages and GDP per worker, migration has a bigger
impact the bigger its labor content. In the case of GDP per capita, things
are less clear because there are two oﬀsetting forces at work. Population em-
igration reverses diminishing returns, yielding a positive impact on output
per capita; but selectivity assures that emigration will also take away a dis-
proportionate share of the labor force, lowering output via labor supply
losses, yielding a negative impact on output per capita.16 The latter eﬀect
dominated in the late-nineteenth-century Atlantic economy, so muted
GDP per capita eﬀects are no surprise. Based on table 5.2, we can conclude
that four decades of migration never lowered New World GDP per capita
by more than 9 percent anywhere in the New World, and by as little as 3 per-
cent in the United States, in contrast with per-worker impacts of 21 and 8
percent, respectively.17Similar reasoning applies to the Old World: Swedish
emigration after 1870 may have raised wages in 1910 by about 8 percent, but
it served to raise Sweden’s GDP per capita by only 3 percent.
Mass Migration and Global Inequality
An important extra eﬀect of the great migration on global inequality has
been omitted from the accounting so far. Table 5.2 was constructed to show
the eﬀect of migration on convergence in per capita and per-worker aver-
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15. The contributions of mass migration to convergence in the full sample and within the
New and Old World diﬀer, the intraregional eﬀects being smaller. Furthermore, in two New
World countries, Argentina and Brazil, global convergence would have been greater in the ab-
sence of mass migration. The fact that the Atlantic labor market was segmented should ac-
count for this otherwise bizarre result. Immigrant ﬂows were not eﬃciently distributed every-
where, because barriers to entry limited destination choices for many southern Europeans, a
point central to discussions of Latin American economic performance (Diaz-Alejandro 1970;
Hatton and Williamson 1998, chaps. 2, 3, 6, and 10). Thus, migrants did not always obey some
simple market-wage calculus; kept out of the best high-wage destinations, or having alterna-
tive cultural preferences, many went to the “wrong” countries. The South-South ﬂows from
Italy, Spain, and Portugal to Brazil and Argentina were a strong force for local (Latin), not
global (Atlantic), convergence. Furthermore, while barriers to exit were virtually absent in
most of the Old World, policy in the New World (like assisted passage) still played a part in vi-
olating any simple market-wage calculus.
16. This argument assumes that immigrant remittances—while substantial—were nowhere
near large enough to erase the ﬁrst-order “perverse” eﬀect on GDP per capita.
17. This labor-supply compensation eﬀect operated in addition to the usual human-capital
transfer inﬂuences invoked to describe the net beneﬁt to the United States of the immigrants
received before WWI (Neal and Uselding 1972).ages between countries; it was not constructed to show the impact of mi-
gration on income distribution within the Atlantic economy as a whole. To
do so, we need to add on the large income gains accruing to the 60 million
Europeans who moved overseas. Typically, they came from countries whose
average real wages and average GDP per worker were perhaps only half of
those in the receiving countries. These migrant gains were an important
part of their net equalizing eﬀect on world incomes, and even on “world”
income distribution among the seventeen countries in table 5.2.
Capital Flow Responses?
Using ceteris paribus assumptions, we earlier concluded that mass mi-
gration accounted for all of the real wage convergence observed in the At-
lantic economy between 1870 and 1910. But other things were not constant.
There were other powerful proconvergence and anticonvergence forces at
work, capital accumulation being one of them. We know that capital accu-
mulation was rapid in the New World, so much so that the rate of capital
deepening was faster in the United States than in any of its European com-
petitors (Wright 1990; Wolﬀ1991), and the same was probably true of other
rich New World countries. Thus, the mass migrations may have been at least
partially oﬀset by capital accumulation, and a large part of that capital
widening was being carried by international capital ﬂows that reached mag-
nitudes unsurpassed before or since, as Obstfeld and Taylor show in chap-
ter 3 in this volume. The evidence on the role of global capital market re-
sponses to migration is very tentative, but Taylor and Williamson (1997,
tables 4–6a) make exactly this kind of adjustment. They implement the
zero-net-migration counterfactual in a model where the labor supply
shocks generate capital inﬂows or outﬂows in order to maintain a constant
rate of return on capital in each country (e.g., perfect global capital market
integration). The capital-chasing-labor oﬀsets are very large. Whereas mass
migration explained all of the observed real wage convergence using the
model without capital chasing labor, it explains about 70 percent of the con-
vergence using the model with capital chasing labor, leaving only about 30
percent to other forces. The ﬁndings for labor productivity are similar.
Capital Flows, Convergence, and the Lucas Paradox
Although it is true that capital markets were at least as well integrated
globally prior to World War I as they are today, capital ﬂows were mainly
an anticonvergence force. This apparently counterintuitive statement is, of
course, inconsistent with a simple theory predicting that capital should ﬂow
from rich countries (presumably capital abundant) to poor countries (pre-
sumably capital scarce). It did not. Just as Lucas (1990) reported for the late
twentieth century, Clemens and Williamson (2000) ﬁnd that capital inﬂows
and GDP per capita were positively correlated between 1870 and 1913. The
so-called Lucas paradox was alive and well a century ago, and it is explained
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populations, and human-capital abundance. Thus, capital ﬂows were an an-
ticonvergence force. They drifted toward rich, not poor, countries; they
raised wages and labor productivity in the resource-abundant New World;
and, with the exception of Scandinavia, their exit from Europe lowered
wages and labor productivity in that resource-scarce part of the world.
5.3.4 Summing Up: Nineteenth-Century Convergence
Forces in a Diverging World
Among the main participants in the nineteenth-century economy, glob-
alization had oﬀsetting eﬀects. Within rich, land-abundant New World
countries, more trade and more immigration augmented inequality. Within
poor, primary-product-exporting third world countries, they did the same.
Within poor, land-scarce, participating Old World countries, more trade
and more emigration reduced inequality. As for income gaps between coun-
tries, migration had an equalizing eﬀect, one that was somewhat oﬀset by
the fact that capital ﬂowed to rich New World countries. Freer trade might
also have had an egalitarian eﬀect, beneﬁting the poorer new participants
like Japan the most, although it may not have favored peripheral counties
that were led into deindustrialization. Overall, prewar globalization looks
like a force equalizing average incomes between the participating countries,
but with mixed eﬀects on inequality within participating countries.
If globalization had mixed eﬀects that probably tilted a bit toward global
equalization among the countries involved, why does world income in-
equality rise so much in ﬁgure 5.1? One answer, of course, is that average na-
tional incomes were driven apart by more fundamental forces, such as in-
equalities in schooling, secure property rights, and government quality.
Another answer is that there were no mass migrations between poor pe-
riphery and rich center.18 A third answer is that many countries remained
detached from the global economy by choice (e.g., Iberia) or by distance
(e.g., much of inland Africa, Asia, and Latin America).
5.4 Retreat from Globalization 1914–50: Raising New Policy Barriers
As table 5.1 documents, the globalized world that fell apart after 1914
was not rebuilt during the interwar decades. Indeed, what distinguishes the
interwar period is that globalization was dismantled solely by government
policy. Governments imposed trade and factor market barriers where there
were none before, and some even blocked communications. The interwar
period was not marked by some disappearance of the previous nonpolicy
sources of globalization. The big productivity gains in transportation and
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18. There was, of course, mass migration within the poor periphery, even though economic
historians have paid little attention to it.communications did not evaporate. Nor was there any collapse in world
population growth—only new policy barriers imposed on poor popula-
tions that restricted their ability to ﬂee miserable conditions for something
better. The pace of technological progress may have slowed down, but,
more importantly, the appearance of new disincentives reduced investment
in the diﬀusion of modern technology around the world. In short, the in-
terwar retreat from globalization was carried by antiglobal economic poli-
cies.
To judge what eﬀect these antiglobal policies had on global inequality, let
us begin with the overall trend in world inequality and then look at the role
of policy in shaping that trend. Our expectations are to ﬁnd symmetry be-
tween the pre-1914 and interwar periods. Thus, we expect to ﬁnd the fol-
lowing: a convergence slowdown in the deglobalizing Atlantic economy
(and perhaps even an acceleration in the rising trend in inequality gaps
worldwide); an easement in the inequality forces operating within rich, la-
bor-scarce economies; and an easement of the egalitarian forces operating
within poor, labor-scarce economies.
5.4.1 Between-Country Income Gaps 1914–50
Figure 5.1 documents an interwar acceleration in the rising trend toward
inequality between countries. In fact, over the almost two centuries docu-
mented by Bourguignon and Morrisson in that ﬁgure, there was no period
when divergence between countries was more “big time.” We do not yet
know how much of this should be attributed to the Great Depression, two
world wars, antiglobal policies, and other forces. However, there is plenty
of evidence documenting that convergence stopped in the Atlantic econ-
omy before 1929 (Williamson 1996), when deglobalization was having an
inegalitarian inﬂuence independent of war and depression. Migration bar-
riers deﬁnitely widened international income gaps, and new barriers to
trade and capital ﬂows probably added to those widening gaps.
5.4.2 Within-Country Inequality Trends 1914–50
Figure 5.1 also shows that within-country inequality took a sharp nose
dive between 1910 and 1950. This change is the most dramatic regime
switch documented in the ﬁgure. While poor, labor-abundant OECD coun-
tries lost their pre-1914 egalitarian trends—some actually drifting toward
greater inequality—the industrial European countries continued their egal-
itarian drift, and the rich, labor-scarce New World countries underwent
egalitarian trends that were then called “revolutionary” (Lindert and
Williamson 1985; Williamson 1997; Lindert 2000; Bourguignon and Mor-
risson 2002). True, deglobalization can hardly account for all of this world-
wide within-country inequality nose dive; after all, those high pre–World
War I within-country inequality levels were never recovered when global-
ization was reclaimed by the end of the twentieth century. The new barriers
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ered it in receiving countries,19reversing the prewar eﬀects. Since the impact
of new trade barriers on interwar within-country inequality has not yet
been assessed, the overall eﬀect of 1914–50 deglobalization on worldwide
within-country inequality will have to await future research.
5.5 Back on Track: The Second Globalization Boom
Globalization by any deﬁnition resumed after World War II. It has di-
ﬀered from pre-1914 globalization in several ways.20Factor migrations have
been less impressive by most measures. The foreign-born are a smaller share
of the total population than they were in the main Western Hemisphere re-
ceiving nations in 1913 (table 5.1), and capital exports were a smaller per-
centage of GDP in the postwar United States (0.5 percent in 1960–73 and
1.2 percent in 1989–96; Obstfeld and Taylor 1998, table 11.1) than they were
in prewar Great Britain (4.6 percent in 1890–1913). On the other hand,
trade barriers are probably lower today than they were in 1913. These diﬀer-
ences are tied to policy changes in one dominant nation, the United States,
which has switched from a protectionist welcoming immigrants to a free
trader restricting immigration. Another diﬀerence has already been re-
vealed in ﬁgure 5.1: The postwar world started out much more unequal than
the world of 1820 or 1870, and international income gaps, not income gaps
within countries, now dominate the global inequality of living standards.
5.5.1 International Gaps Again: An Epochal Turning Point?
While the issues are elaborated in far greater detail by J. Bradford De-
Long and Steve Dowrick in chapter 4 of this volume, we need to review here
what has happened to between-country income gaps since 1950. Figure 5.1
uses data from Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) to document what looks
like a mid-twentieth-century turning point in their between-country in-
equality index, which slows its rise after 1950. However, the Bourguignon
and Morrisson long-period database contains only ﬁfteen countries. Using
postwar purchasing-power-parity data for a much bigger sample of 115,
Melchior, Telle, and Wiig (2000, 14) actually document a declinein their be-
tween-country inequality index in the second half of the twentieth century.
The authors show stability in between-country inequality up to the late
1970s, followed by convergence centered on the early 1980s and early 1990s.
Four other recent studies ﬁnd the same fall in between-country inequality
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19. This, after all, was one central motivation for the legislation that ﬁnally brought quotas
to North America in the 1920s, after heated public debate over a quarter of a century (Goldin
1994; Timmer and Williamson 1998). 
20. See Baldwin and Martin 1999; Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin 1999; Findlay and
O’Rourke, ch. 1 in this volume; Chiswick and Hatton, ch. 2 in this volume; and section 5.3 in
this chapter.after the early 1960s (Schultz 1998; Firebaugh 1999; Boltho and Toniolo
1999; Radetzki and Jonsson 2000).21 Among these ﬁve recent studies, per-
haps most useful in identifying an epochal regime switch is that of Boltho
and Toniolo (1999, plotted in Bourguinon and Morrisson, 2002, diagram
2.4, p. 16), who show a rise in between-country inequality in the 1940s,
rough stability over the next three decades, and a signiﬁcant fall after 1980,
signiﬁcant enough to make their between-country inequality index drop
well below its 1950 level.
Did the postwar switch from autarky to global integration contribute to
this epochal change in the evolution of international gaps in average in-
comes? Here we seek the answer focusing on trade, returning later to factor
migration.
5.5.2 Trade and Postwar Between-Country Inequality
Conventional thinking presumes that liberalizing trade should have ben-
eﬁted third world countries more than it beneﬁted leading industrial coun-
tries. The reasoning is the same as that already introduced when we sur-
veyed pre-1914 experience. First, liberalizing trade should have a bigger
eﬀect on the terms of trade of the country joining the larger integrated
world economy than on countries already integrated. Second, the more a
country’s terms of trade are changed, the bigger the gain in national in-
come.22
In one simple respect, the gains from postwar liberalization should have
been greater among the high-income OECD countries than among poorer
countries as a whole. The postwar trade that was liberalized the most was in
fact intra-OECD trade, not trade between the OECD and the rest. From the
very beginning in the 1940s, the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade
(GATT) explicitly excused low-income countries from the need to disman-
tle their import barriers and exchange controls. This permission probably
lowered their national incomes, but it was consistent with the dominant
protectionist and antiglobal ideology prevailing in emerging nations at that
time. Thus, the succeeding rounds of liberalization under GATT, from the
Dillon and Kennedy Rounds through the Uruguay Round, brought freer
trade and higher incomes mainly to OECD members. We emphasize again
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21. They all use purchasing power parity data for which the fall is far clearer. Indeed, it dis-
appears in studies that use income data in U.S. dollars (Melchior, Telle, and Wiig 2000, dia-
gram 2.4, p. 16). See also Dowrick and DeLong, chap. 4 in this volume.
22. As we noted for the 1820–1913 era, poor-country gains from trade depend on whether
expanding before 1914 may have induced deindustrialization in poorer countries. Did the same
happen after World War II? Probably not. After all, industrial manufactures have been a rap-
idly rising share of third world output and exports. For example, for all “developing” (third
world) countries, manufactures rose from only 17.4 percent of commodity exports in 1970 to
64.3 percent by 1994 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 1988 and 1997).
Enough of the third world is now labor-abundant and natural-resource-scarce so that the
growth of trade has helped it industrialize. The classic image of third world specialization in
primary products is becoming obsolete.that these facts do not show that globalization favors rich participants.
Rather, globalization favors all participants who liberalize, especially those
who are newly industrializing, and penalizes those who choose not to liber-
alize, leaving them behind.
The abundant literature on trade liberalization in the third world is, un-
fortunately, limited to analysis of the eﬀects of one country’s liberalization
on its own income and ignores eﬀects on the rest of the world. This limita-
tion may be innocuous for small countries, but it is a serious omission for
the giants. Thus, we have only assessments of China’s liberalization on
China, not of China’s liberalization on the world. The same is true of the
United States, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and other gi-
ants. Still, this literature does yield fairly ﬁrm conclusions about whether
liberalizing countries gain from freer trade.
Four kinds of studies have tried to judge the gains from freer trade, or the
losses from more protection, in the developing countries. Led by a large Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) project on trade and ex-
change-control regimes in the 1960s and 1970s, economists explored the sec-
toral connections between protection and growth in fourteen developing
countries. To quantify the overall eﬀects of complicated trade regimes, the
authors resorted to classic partial-equilibrium calculations of deadweight
costs.23 They concluded that the barriers imposed signiﬁcant costs on Ar-
gentina, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, India, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan,
the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey.24 By themselves, these
standard welfare calculations are vulnerable to the charge of assuming, not
proving, that trade barriers were bad for these developing countries. Such
calculations assume that all the relevant eﬀects are captured by measures of
consumer and producer surplus, without allowing protection any chance to
lower long-run cost curves, as it is assumed to do in the traditional infant-
industry case, and to foster industrialization and thus growth, as in those
modern growth models where industry is the carrier of technological change
and capital deepening. Thus, it would be fair to demand more proof than
that oﬀered by the comparative static calculations of the 1960s and 1970s.
A second kind of evidence consists of cross-country growth studies that
contrast the growth performance of relatively open and closed economies.
The World Bank conducted such studies for forty-one countries in the pe-
riods before and after the ﬁrst oil shock. Table 5.3 extends this coverage
through 1992. The correlation between trade openness and growth seems
clear enough in this demonstration, but the correlation is vulnerable to two
criticisms. First, assigning countries to trade policy categories is always
tricky, since it is hard to measure overall openness. Second, and much more
importantly, it is hard to isolate the eﬀect of trade policies alone, since other
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23. Bhagwati and Krueger (1973–76). See also Balassa (1971) and Papageorgiou, Michaely,
and Choksi (1991).
24. Only in Malaysia did the import barriers yield a slight gain, and that was because of fa-
vorable terms-of-trade eﬀects.policies are usually changing at the same time. Liberalism typically comes
as a package. Thus, countries that liberalized their trade also liberalized
their domestic factor markets, liberalized their domestic commodity mar-
kets, and set up better property-rights enforcement.25 The appearance of
these non-trade policies may deserve more credit for raising income than
the simultaneous appearance of more liberal trade policies.
A third kind of evidence comes from event studies. Here the strategy is to
focus on periods when trade policy changed the most so as to see its eﬀect
on growth. For example, Krueger (1983, 1984) looked at trade-opening mo-
ments in South Korea around 1960, Brazil and Colombia around 1965, and
Tunisia around 1970. Growth improved after liberalization in all four cases
(Krueger 1983, 1984). More recently, Dollar and Kraay (2000b) examined
the reforms and trade liberalizations of sixteen countries in the 1980s and
1990s, ﬁnding, once again, the positive correlation between freer trade
and faster growth. Here, too, critics could argue that the reform episodes
changed more than just participation in the global economy, so that an in-
dependent trade eﬀect has not been isolated.
Finally, recent studies have used multivariate econometric analysis in an
attempt to resolve the doubts left by simpler historical correlations. The
number of national experiences analyzed statistically now numbers in the
hundreds (Edwards 1992, 1993; Dollar 1992; Dollar and Kraay 2000a, b.)
Even with several other variables held constant, those studies show that
freer trade policies tend to have a positive eﬀect on growth, although one
cannot statistically reject a zero eﬀect in many of the tests. These econo-
metric studies have raised the scientiﬁc standard of inquiry about the eﬀects
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Table 5.3 Trade Policy Orientation and Growth Rates in the Third World, 1963–92
Average Annual Growth Rates of 
GDP Per Capita (%)
Orientation 1963–73 1973–85 1980–92
Strongly open to trade 6.9 5.9 6.4
Moderately open 4.9 1.6 2.3
Moderately antitrade 4.0 1.7 –0.2
Strongly antitrade 1.6 –0.1 –0.4
Sources: World Bank (1987, 78–94), with further growth data from World Bank 1994.
Notes: In all periods the three strongly open economies were Hong Kong, South Korea, and
Singapore. The identities of the strongly antitrade countries changed over time. In 1963–73,
they consisted of Argentina, Bangladesh, Burundi, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia,
Ghana, India, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Turkey, Uruguay, and Zambia.
For the two overlapping later periods the strongly antitrade group consisted of the previous
sixteen plus Bolivia, Madagascar, and Nigeria, but minus Chile, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey,
and Uruguay. For the identities of the moderate-policy groups, see World Bank (1987, 78–94).
25. This was true, for example, in Great Britain, where the 1846 repeal of the Corn Laws was
immersed in a deluge of domestic liberal reform.of trade policy, although critics are free to raise their standards too, retain-
ing doubts about omitted variables, simultaneity, and details of the error
term in each econometric equation. And economic historians might argue
that it depends on when a country goes global: Are its trading partners lib-
eralizing too? Are its competitors liberalizing? Is the liberalizing country
ready for industrialization, accumulation, and human capital deepening, or
will it be driven instead up some primary-product-producing dead end? It
might be argued that conditions were less auspicious for third world liber-
alization in 1870–1914 or 1914–60 than since 1960, or, as we shall see, in the
1980s and 1990s compared with the 1960s and 1970s.
The doubts that each individual study might raise threaten to block our
view of the overall forest of evidence. Even though no one study can estab-
lish that trade openness has unambiguously helped the representative third
world economy, the preponderance of evidence does seem to support this
conclusion. One way to see the whole forest more clearly is to consider two
sets, one almost empty and one completely empty. The almost-empty set
consists of all statistical studies showing that protection helps third world
economic growth or that liberalization harms it. The set would have been
completely empty had not Bairoch (1972, 1989) and O’Rourke (2000) both
found that protectionist countries grew faster before 1914. Thus, their
ﬁndings suggest a paradox: Although the protection-growth correlation
was negative after 1950, it was positive before 1914. True, Bairoch and
O’Rourke did not evaluate third world countries, since their samples in-
cluded only a few members of the Atlantic economy club. However, they get
support from Clemens and Williamson (2001), who have recently shown
that the positive protection-growth pre-1914 paradox holds for a much big-
ger world sample, and even holds through the late 1920s, but the correlation
is far weaker and often negative for the European and the third world pe-
riphery. Clemens and Williamson also show how the world trade environ-
ment accounts for the pre-1914 versus post-1950 contrast. The negative
(positive) correlation between openness (protection) and growth before
1914 is also consistent with the recent ﬁnding by Hadass and Williamson
(2001) that terms-of-trade improvements associated with globalization re-
duced long-run income growth between 1870 and 1940 in the periphery
while raising it in the center. The fact that this set is almost but not com-
pletely empty raises a challenge; observers will have to deal with the histor-
ical paradox in future work.
The second, and this time empty, set contains those countries that chose
to be less open to trade and factor ﬂows in the 1990s than in the 1960s and
rose in the global living-standard ranks at the same time. As far as we can
tell, there are no antiglobal victories to report for the postwar third world.26
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26. Going back further to 1928 would, however, capture the Soviet Union, a country that
took oﬀ while deglobalizing. Emerging nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America certainly
saw this as an antiglobal victory, but Stalin might have done far better had he stayed open.We infer that this is because freer trade stimulates growth in the third world
today, regardless of its eﬀects before 1940.27
Timing matters, and, in retrospect, we think we can detect a hidden
source of East Asian super-growth by appealing to it. Other countries may
have given the East Asians their chance by failing to compete in labor-
intensive manufacturing export markets and make market reforms, long be-
fore the 1980s. Thus, the original Four Tigers—Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong—probably owe much of their export-led success
in the 1960s and 1970s to the protectionist and illiberal domestic policies of
mainland China, North Korea, Vietnam, Burma, Bangladesh, India, and
Pakistan. In the 1980s a newly opened China began to catch up, perhaps
partly because India and the others remained so antitrade.28
Trade and Inequality within Postwar Third World Countries
Although removing barriers to trade may raise per capita income in de-
veloping countries, what does it do to inequality within them? The simple
Stolper-Samuelson model, as we have noted, would predict that freer trade
would be egalitarian for these countries, since it allows those abundant in
unskilled labor to shift toward unskilled-labor-intensive production, rais-
ing unskilled wages relative to skilled wages and returns on property. Has
this been true?
The eﬀect of globalization on inequality within third world countries is
just as hard to chart for the postwar era as it is for the pre-1914 era. The
postwar data are still sparse, and they are available for only a few countries.
Fortunately, we can get a good idea of the overall eﬀect on within-country
inequality just by following the experience of a few giants neglected by the
literature, but we start with the smaller countries that have been studied in
far greater detail.
Some Latin and Asian Experience. The recent literature on globalization
and inequality within developing countries since the 1960s has a pretty nar-
row focus. It has concentrated on nine countries—six Latins (Argentina,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay) and three East Asians
(Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan). In order to test the Stolper-Samuelson
prediction, the recent literature has dwelt on the pay gaps between skilled
and unskilled workers.
This recent assessment of the globalization and inequality connection in
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27. As economic historians, we want to know whether what is true now was true a century
ago, and if not, why not. Has a shift toward beneﬁting from trade been due to a century of
faster population growth in the third world, which has shifted its comparative advantage to-
ward labor-intensive manufactures and away from resource-intensive primary products? To
what extent is this shift just a reﬂection of the opening up of labor-abundant and resource-
scarce Japan, Korea, and China to world trade? These issues are on the research agenda.
28. The experiences of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia are consistent with this conjec-
ture because these three countries were intermediate in all respects—in both the levels and the
rates of change in their trade barriers and their incomes.developing countries diverges sharply between regions and epochs. Wage
gaps seemed to fall when the three Asian tigers liberalized in the 1960s and
early 1970s. Yet wage gaps generally widened when the six Latin American
countries liberalized after the late 1970s (Wood 1994, 1997, 1998; Feenstra
and Hanson 1997; Robbins 1997; Robbins and Gindling 1999; Hanson and
Harrison 1999). Why the diﬀerence?
As Wood (1997) has rightly pointed out, historical context was impor-
tant, since other things were not equal during these liberalizations. The
clearest example in which a Latin wage widening appears to refute the egal-
itarian Stolper-Samuelson prediction was the Mexican liberalization under
Salinas in 1985–90. Yet this liberalization move coincided with the major
entry of China and other Asian exporters into world markets. Thus, Mex-
ico faced intense new competition from less skill-intensive manufactures in
all export markets.29 Furthermore, blue-collar wage rates were already
higher in Mexico than in many Asian countries, suggesting that the widen-
ing of Mexican pay gaps in 1985–90 actually ﬁts the Stolper-Samuelson pre-
diction because at that point Mexico was a high-wage country in the rele-
vant world export markets.
Historical context could also explain why trade liberalization coincided
with wage widening in the ﬁve other Latin countries, and why it coincided
with wage narrowing in East Asia in the 1960s and early 1970s. Again, tim-
ing matters. Competition from other low-wage countries was far less intense
when the Asian tigers pulled down their barriers in the 1960s and early 1970s
compared with the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Latin Americans
opened up. In addition, trade liberalization in Argentina 1976–82 was ac-
companied by union-busting and an easing of minimum-wage controls. The
same policies were carried out with an even ﬁrmer hand in Pinochet’s Chile
1974–79, another documented case of wage widening coinciding with trade
liberalization. In these cases, at least, wages may have widened for reasons
other than the liberalization of international trade and foreign investment.
The Experience of the Giants. Past evidence on the wage-inequality and
trade-liberalization connection in developing countries has been decidedly
mixed.30 But even if the ﬁndings from the usually studied developing coun-
tries were not mixed, they could not have had much of an impact on global
inequalities. After all, the half-dozen Latin countries, plus the three Asian
tigers, are tiny relative to four huge countries that have undergone even
larger policy shocks. Speciﬁcally, the literature has focused on nine countries
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29. It might also be relevant to point out that Mexico’s own import liberalization brought
much greater tariﬀ reductions on low-skill manufactures than on high-skill manufactures.
30. One other indicator, however, may tip the scale toward the belief that globalization
widens pay gaps in developing countries: Latin American employees of multinational ﬁrms
and international joint ventures receive higher wages, with or without adjustment for skills and
other factors (Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey 1996; Pavcnik 2000).that together had less than 200 million people in 1980, whereas China by it-
self had 980 million, India 687 million, Indonesia 148 million, and Russia
139 million. All four of these giants recorded widening income gaps after
their economies liberalized. The widening did not start in China until after
1984, because the initial reforms were rural and agricultural and therefore
had an egalitarian eﬀect. After the reforms reached the urban-industrial sec-
tor in 1984, China’s income gaps widened (Griﬃn and Zhao 1993, especially
p. 61; Atinc 1997; World Bank 1993–2000/1; Chowdhury, Harvie, and Levy
2000). India’s inequality has risen since liberalization started in the early
1990s. Indonesian incomes became increasingly concentrated in the top
decile from the 1970s to the 1990s, although this probably owed more to the
Suharto regime’s ownership of the new oil wealth than to any conventional
trade-liberalization eﬀect. Russian inequalities soared after the collapse of
the Soviet regime in 1991 (Flemming and Micklewright 2000).
Income widening in these four giants dominates global trends in intrana-
tional inequalities,31but how much was due to liberal trade policy and glob-
alization? Probably very little. Indeed, much of the inequality surge during
their liberalization experiments seems linked to the fact that the opening to
trade and foreign investment was incomplete. That is, the rise in inequality
appears to have been based on the exclusion of much of the population
from the beneﬁts of globalization.
China, where the gains since 1984 have been heavily concentrated in
the coastal cities and provinces (Griﬃn and Zhao 1993; Atinc 1997), oﬀers
a good example. Migration from the hinterland to the cities was pretty much
prohibited before the mid-1990s. Those that were able to participate in the
new, globally linked economy prospered faster than ever before, while the
rest in the hinterland were left behind, or at least enjoyed less economic suc-
cess. China’s inequality had risen to American levels by 1995 (a Gini of
.406), but the pronounced surge in inequality from 1984 to 1995 was domi-
nated by the rise in urban-rural and coastal-hinterland gaps, not by widen-
ing gaps within any given locale. This pattern suggests that China’s inequal-
ity has been raised by diﬀerential access to the beneﬁts of the new economy,
not by widening gaps among those who participate in it, or among those
who do not.32
Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal? 255
31. The giants also dominate trends in between-country inequality. Much of the fall in the
between-country inequality index oﬀered by Melchior, Telle, and Wiig (2000, 15) is due to the
fact that the populations in Japan and the United States are getting relatively fewer and less
rich, while those in China and India are getting richer and more populous.
32. In Russia, the beneﬁts were also skewed toward those who were able to participate in the
reforms and internationalization, although for a diﬀerent reason. The handing over of state
trading prerogatives and physical assets to a few oligarchs contributed to one of the greatest
inequality surges in history (Flemming and Micklewright 2000). Similarly, the assets of the
Suharto family and its cronies in Indonesia tended to be concentrated in the expanding trade
sector. More comprehensive and competitive access to the international economy might have
brought a more egalitarian result in each of these cases.Multinationals, Sweatshops, and Children. One theme that has dominated
recent news coverage about global interactions and global inequality is the
imagined association of multinational enterprise with harsh “sweatshop”
labor conditions and the use of child labor in the third world. The imagery
is familiar: Pakistani boys sew soccer balls, Chinese women make Kathie
Lee wardrobe items, and Indonesians make Nike running shoes, all far into
the night. Do such interactions widen the income gaps between rich and
poor countries? Do they beneﬁt only the multinational ﬁrms that employ
cheap third world labor?33
Two issues of global concern overlap here. One is the extent to which em-
ployers violate International Labor Organization (ILO) codes and labor
standards regarding fair labor contracts and exploit both adults and chil-
dren. The other is whether the employment of third world children is at the
expense of their schooling, their best investment for the long run. Both are
legitimate concerns. The ﬁrst calls for international and national monitor-
ing to enforce legal codes, although the codes themselves have been vague,
perhaps necessarily so (Brown 2001). The second calls for pressure on gov-
ernments to supply tax-based schooling, as all industrialized countries did
when  launching primary education in the nineteenth century (Lindert
2001). Both are complex issues, and the relevant theory and evidence are
still just emerging (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International
Aﬀairs 1995–2000; Basu 1999).
As far as one can tell from partial evidence, however, neither of these po-
tential evils is connected with globalization. The employment of children or
other unskilled labor by multinational ﬁrms probably reduces those wide
income gaps between countries. After all, there is no positive correlation be-
tween nonagricultural international exchange and the use of child labor—
either over time, or across countries, or across sectors of any economy. Dur-
ing the globalizing half-century since 1950, the rates of work by children
under ﬁfteen have been declining in every ILO country, and school enroll-
ment rates have been rising (Brown 2001). The rates of work and non-
schooling are lowest in the most internationally involved countries. The
most visible recent case of a country’s suddenly joining the international
economy is China, where the rate of decline in child labor has been faster
since 1980 than in the rest of the third world, and faster than it was previ-
ously under Chairman Mao. And across sectors of China’s economy, the
highly publicized manufacturing-export sector has a rate of child employ-
ment that is well below the national average. The multinationals hire more
skilled, and more schooled, labor than the national average.
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33. For a typical recent presentation of prima facie evidence of labor abuse involving man-
ufacturing exports from the Third World, see Bernstein, Shari, and Malkin (2000). For a
longer presentation of the imagery, see Greider (1997). The social reform literature on child la-
bor in British cities during the ﬁrst industrial revolution reads pretty much the same way, but
some say abuse was minor (Nardinelli 1990) whereas others say it was major (Tuttle 1999).Would a ban on the use of child labor in globally connected activities
send third world children back to school? As Basu (1999) has pointed out,
a ban targeted at child labor in manufacturing export sectors would prob-
ably send children back to agriculture, where they work the most and attend
school the least. It is diﬃcult to see how future third world generations
would catch up with the high-income world any faster if there were bans on
the export of manufactures that use child labor. Where third world paths to
school and faster income growth seem blocked, they are not blocked by
employment opportunities in the modern export sector. Instead, they are
blocked by the lack of national political resolve to raise tax support for
schools.
What Role for Globalization in OECD Wage Inequality since the 1970s?
The best-documented and most heatedly debated experience linking glob-
alization with inequality is the recent OECD wage widening, especially
within the United States and the United Kingdom. An enormous amount of
recent research now gives us a pretty clear idea of the share of rising in-
equality that should be attributed to an increase in international integration.
How Wage Gaps Moved. The trend toward wider wage gaps in America and
Great Britain was unmistakable in the 1980s and early 1990s, as illustrated
in ﬁgure 5.6. It showed up in ratios of the 90th percentile full-time wage to
the 50th or 10th percentile full-time wage, either for men or for women. In
the United States, a rise also took place in the full-time pay ratios of college
graduates to high school graduates, and in the pay ratio of nonproduction
employees to production employees. The widening has been severe enough
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Fig. 5.6 Inequality of full-time earnings of male employees in six countries, 1978–
90that lower-skilled groups had no gain, and probably a slight loss, in real pay
over the whole quarter-century 1973–98, despite a healthy growth of real
earnings for the labor force as a whole.34
Other OECD countries probably also experienced pay widening across
the 1980s, although diﬀerent measures tell diﬀerent stories. Sticking with
full-time labor earnings, one cannot ﬁnd much widening at all for France or
Japan, and none for Germany or Italy, as in ﬁgure 5.6. Yet income measures
that take work hours and unemployment into account reveal some widen-
ing even in those cases. A recent OECD study surveyed the inequality of
disposable household income from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s (Burni-
aux et al. 1998, tables 2.1, 2.2, and 3.1–4.9). Between the mid-1970s and the
mid-1980s, the Americans and British were alone in having a clear rise in in-
equality. From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, however, twenty out of
twenty-one OECD countries had a noticeable rise in inequality. Further-
more, the main source of rising income inequality after the mid-1980s was
the widening of labor earnings. The fact that labor earnings became more
unequal in most OECD countries, when full-time labor earnings did not,
suggests that many countries took their inequality in the form of more un-
employment and hours reduction, a well-documented tendency for West-
ern Europe in those years.
What Widened American Wage Gaps? The recent American wage widening
has generated an energetic search for its sources, and they are of two sorts.
First, there are aspects of globalization: the rise in unskilled worker immi-
gration rates, due to rising foreign immigrant supply or a liberalization of
U.S. immigration policy (or both). Increased competition from imports that
use unskilled labor more intensively than the rest of the economy must be
added to the immigration impact. This increased competition is due to for-
eign supply improvements, including that carried by U.S. outsourcing; inter-
national transportation improvements; and trade-liberalizing policies. Sec-
ond, there are those sources apparently unrelated to globalization, including
a slowdown in the growth of labor-force skills; a weakening of labor unions,
which have long lobbied for ﬂatter pay scales; and biased technological
change that cuts the demand for unskilled workers relative to skilled workers.
Most contributions to the debate have had a narrower focus than the pre-
vious summary would suggest. They have retreated to judging a “trade ver-
sus technology” contest, ignoring the possible roles of unions, immigration,
and skills or schooling supply.35 Some agree with Wood (1994, 1998) that
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34. The assertion about absolute living standards awaits the results of debate about exag-
gerated measurement of cost-of-living increases over the same period in the United States
(Boskin et al. 1998).
35. For a survey of the whole literature up through 1996, see Cline (1997, especially table 2.3
and the surrounding text). For a more up-to-date survey, with deeper coverage of certain
econometric issues, see the volume edited by Feenstra (2000), particularly the editor’s intro-
duction and the contributions by Slaughter (2000) and Harrigan (2000) in that volume.trade is to blame for much of the observed wage widening. Others reject this
conclusion, arguing that most or all of the widening is due to a shift in tech-
nology that has been strongly biased in favor of higher-skill occupational
groups (Lawrence and Slaughter 1993; Berman, Bound, and Griliches
1994). Most estimates tend to resemble the guess by Feenstra and Hanson
(1999) that perhaps 15–33 percent of the rising inequality is due to trade
competition, including outsourcing.
Nonspecialists observing this debate need to pay close attention to how
the participants deal with a fundamental endogeneity issue. Are globaliza-
tion and technology change independent, or does one drive the other?
Those inclined to absolve globalization point out that the rise of imports,
and the decline of import-competing jobs, is often a by-product of healthy
growth, both in the OECD and the third world exporters. To these partici-
pants, technological change drives globalization. Two examples taken from
the debate illustrate the opposing view. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) argue
that skill-saving technological bias within the United States is a by-product
of the global communications revolution that allows better monitoring of
foreign production and just-in-time inventory delivery from abroad. Thus,
Lawrence (2000) argues that rising import competition deserves credit for
much of America’s technological progress. To these participants, globaliza-
tion drives technological change.
The boldest attempt at an overall quantitative accounting of these po-
tential sources is the appraisal by Cline (1997). Cline’s interpretation of his
estimates diﬀers from ours. Cline blames globalization less than do most
writers on the subject, and he emerges with a huge 58 percent unexplained
residual. In a summary table (1997, table 5.1), Cline suggests that about half
of this residual was due to skill-biased technological change, and the re-
sulting 29 percent technology eﬀect is bigger than any globalization eﬀect.
However, there is a second way to read Cline’s table. His nonglobalization
sources appear to almost balance out (1.58   .65   1.03, or only 3 per-
centage points), whereas his globalization forces could explain almost all
the wage-gap widening (16 out of 18 percentage points). The proper ques-
tion, typically left unasked, is how the period 1973–93 diﬀered from the one
that preceded it, 1953–73. If the other sources added up to pretty much the
same impact in the ﬁrst two-decade period, then it would be the change in
globalization forces between the two periods that mattered.
Broader Perspectives. Although the recent exploration of the determinants
of American wage inequality has established fairly ﬁrm results, the debate
is still too narrow to judge the full impact of globalization on inequality
within the industrial OECD. Several extensions are needed before the evi-
dence can be said to have dealt with the big questions that sparked the de-
bate. One extension would be in the direction of more evidence, whereas an-
other would be in the direction of more comprehensive measures.
Regarding the use of more evidence, note that the literature has thrown
Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal? 259away information by conﬁning itself to the era of widening wage gaps since
about 1980. After all, when the world economy became increasingly in-
tegrated in the century or two before 1980, technology also had its factor
biases, and the mismatch between technological bias and skills growth
kept shifting (Williamson and Lindert 1980; Goldin and Katz 1999, 2000).
Why the inequality booms and busts in America over the past century or
two? Any attempt to distill the eﬀects of globalization on inequality needs
to answer that question. Furthermore, the literature is dominated exces-
sively by American experience, so we need more economic histories to right
the balance. After all, while recent inequality rose just as steeply in Great
Britain, the steepness of the rise varied a great deal across the OECD.36
Why?
Conﬁning our view to employee earnings has also denied us extra per-
spective on both the scope and the source of the rise in inequality. What
happened to self-employment income, property income, proﬁts, and execu-
tive compensation?37
Regarding the use of measurement, note that any force that creates more
within-country inequality is automatically blunted today—at least in the
OECD, a point that is rarely noted in the inequality debate. Any rise in
household net disposable post-ﬁsc income inequality will always be less
than the rise in gross nominal pre-ﬁsc income inequality. Tax-and-transfer
systems guarantee this result in the OECD. Any damage to the earnings of
low-skilled workers is partially oﬀset by their lower tax payments and
higher transfer receipts, like unemployment compensation or family assis-
tance. This broadening of income concept therefore serves to shrink any ap-
parent impact of globalization on the inequality of living standards.38
Does globalization destroy these automatic stabilizers by undermining
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36. Several contributions in the Freeman-Katz volume (1995) do compare explanations of
inequality in the United States versus other countries. However, the focus is on the technology-
skill demand-inequality connection, with almost no attention to possible globalization-skill
demand-inequality connections.
37. Granted, Burniaux and coauthors (1998) did report changes in overall income inequal-
ity for several OECD countries, but they did not attempt to assess competing explanations.
One tantalizing clue that some stories at the top of the income range have been overlooked
comes from recent international comparisons of the compensation of chief executive oﬃcers
(CEOs; Crystal 1993; Abowd and Bognanno 1995). The level of CEO compensation is far
higher in the United States than in other countries, not only in real purchasing power but also
in ratio of their pay to that of ordinary production workers. Did the fact that this CEO pay ad-
vantage rose from the late 1980s to the early 1990s have anything to do with outsourcing, di-
rect foreign investment, and other dimensions of globalization? The link is certainly not obvi-
ous. International diﬀerences in CEO compensation seem to be unrelated to performance,
since U.S. ﬁrms under attack from foreign competition maintained much higher CEO com-
pensation than did their successful foreign competitors. This puzzle should be linked to the
competing theories of the determinants of intranational inequality in the OECD.
38. Although this statement certainly applies today, it did not apply to the ﬁrst globalization
boom before World War I, when such safety nets were not yet in place. Similarly, it will not ap-
ply to any emerging nations where modern safety nets are not yet in place.taxes and social transfer programs? In a world where businesses and skilled
personnel can ﬂee taxes they dislike, there is the well-known danger of a
“race to the bottom,” in which governments compete for internationally
mobile factors by cutting tax rates and therefore cutting social spending. As
Rodrik (1997) has stressed, however, the relationship between a country’s
vulnerability to international markets and the size of its tax-based social
programs is positive, not negative, as a race to the bottom would imply.
Thus, countries with greater vulnerability to global market changes have
higher taxes, more social spending, and broader safety nets. Although there
may be other reasons for this positive raw correlation between openness
and social programs, there is no apparent tendency for globalization to un-
dermine the safety nets.
Postwar International Investment: How Inegalitarian Could It Be?
The fear that globalization is widening world gaps between rich and poor
stems in part from the belief that investors in the rich countries are reaping
all the gains from international investment in the poor countries. These
fears cannot be allayed solely by reference to competitive-market models,
since these fears come from those who do not believe such models. As an al-
ternative demonstration, we can show that the size of such investment in-
come—interest, dividends, repatriated proﬁts, royalties, and fees—is much
too small to account for the global inequalities we observe.
Two pessimistic assumptions will set an upper bound on the extent to
which returns on international investment could have widened world in-
equality. First, suppose nobody else in the world gains from these invest-
ments, so that these rich investors and patent holders are able to collect all
of the returns on them, thus increasing their shares of world income and
world inequality. Alternatively, suppose international investment is a zero-
sum game, so that the amounts gained by the rich international investors
are matched by an equal loss to somebody in the host countries.
Table 5.4 shows that earnings on international investments and technol-
ogy could not be big enough to explain the global inequalities we see, re-
gardless of which extreme assumption one chooses. There are three parts:
The top one (part A) shows what is to be explained, the rise in the share of
the world’s income held by the rich, from 1820 and from 1970; the middle
(part B) assesses the role of returns on international investment under those
two assumptions. The extreme assumption that only the richest are aﬀected
(discussed in part C) leads to the conclusion that investments by ﬁve lead-
ing investor countries (Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United King-
dom, and the United States) in all foreign countries (part B, columns [1] and
[2]) have not been big enough to explain even a third of the rise in world in-
equality since 1970. The extreme assumption that the host countries actu-
ally lose as much as the international investors gain does not magnify the
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countries are typically as rich as the investors’ home countries. In fact, the
world’s largest net borrower since 1980 has been the United States. The
zero-sum assumption therefore actually yields less impact on global in-
equality than the nobody-is-hurt-abroad assumption, since the supposed
losses accrue to people near the top of the world income distribution. The
net eﬀect on global inequality in this case must be practically zero. To sus-
tain pessimism, critics might want our zero-sum assumption to apply only
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Table 5.4 Worst-case Globalization: Overestimates of the Impact of International
Investments on Global Income Inequality
A. Net changes up to 1992, as percent of world income
Since 1820 Since 1970
Top 5% of world incomes +3.8 +1.6
Top 10% of world incomes +10.3 +2.5
Top 20% of world incomes +15.6 +2.4
B. Private investment incomes, as percent of world income
On Investments in All  On Investment in Third 
Foreign Countries World Countries
Since 1820 Since 1970 Since 1820 Since 1970
U.S. investments 
only 0.42 0.18 0.13 0.03
Rough estimate for 
ﬁve  leading 
investor countries 1.72 0.50
C. Maximum impacts on global inequality?
Contrast the historical inequality-related income shifts to be explained (part A, above) with
these incomes involved in international investments up to 1992 (part B). Assuming that inter-
national investment beneﬁts only the investors and that nobody loses income would suggest
using columns (1) and (2) in part B as gains within the top 5 percent of the world income ranks.
However, assuming this implies little pessimism about investment globalization, since nobody
is hurt.
Using the zero-sum assumption that the investments hurt the host countries as much as they
help investors would cancel most of the eﬀect on inequality, since the host countries are usually
as rich as the investing countries. Applying this pessimistic zero-sum assumption only to
columns (3) and (4), the third world investment, gives tiny eﬀects like those shown for the U.S.
investments.
Sources: The changes in top-group shares of world income are from Bourguignon and Mor-
risson (2002, table 1). The changes in U.S. private investment income in foreign countries, in-
cluding royalties and fees, are from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Busi-
ness, various issues. The rough estimate for ﬁve leading countries magniﬁes the U.S. factor
incomes by the relative total (not just private investment) factor-income earnings given by
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, for the ﬁve leading countries chosen here:
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.to investments in the third world, where they are exploitative enough to be
zero-sum for the world. Yet, as table 5.4 (part B) shows for American in-
vestments in the third world, these magnitudes are tiny in relation to global
income and tiny in relation to the net changes to be explained in the top
panel. Even if the impact of other leading investing countries is added, the
basic point remains: International investment cannot account for much of
the observed global inequalities in our modern world, even under extreme
assumptions.
5.6 Adding Up the Eﬀects of Globalization
5.6.1 Sources of World Inequality 1500–2000: The Big Picture
Some patterns have emerged through the complexity of history that sug-
gest a tentative answer to the question posed by this essay’s title: Does glob-
alization make the world more unequal? The patterns cluster around two
observations. One is that the gainers from globalization were never all rich
and the losers were never all poor, or vice versa. The other is that partici-
pants in globalization pulled ahead of nonparticipants. This was true both
for excluded or nonparticipating groups within countries as well as for ex-
cluded or nonparticipating countries.
How these patterns emerge from ﬁve centuries of diverging world in-
comes and a shorter period of globalization is summarized in table 5.5. The
overall trends to be explained are those introduced in ﬁgure 5.1. World in-
come inequality has risen since 1820, and probably since the sixteenth cen-
tury. Most of that increased world inequality took the form of a rise in
income gaps between nations, not of a rise in within-country inequality.
However, the gaps between nations were not widened by participation in
globalization. As for the visible inequalities within countries, the eﬀects di-
ﬀered by region and by historical era. Before World War I, globalization
raised inequality within the United States and other New World countries,
but it had the opposite eﬀect in those European countries that were com-
mitted to trade and sent out emigrants. After World War II, globalization
once again widened inequality within the United States and perhaps other
OECD countries. Globalization may also have raised inequality in the
newly trading and industrializing countries, such as the Asian tigers, China,
Mexico, and Brazil. Yet the rising inequality in these countries was not evi-
dent among persons and households in the newly trading regions and sec-
tors. Rather, it took the form of widening gaps between them and the less
prosperous, nonparticipating regions. The poorest regions and the poorest
countries were probably not hurt by globalization; they just failed to be part
of it. Where the nonparticipants were actively excluded, the policies yield-
ing that inegalitarian result can hardly be called liberal, but globalization
cannot be made to take the blame.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.5.6.2 How Unequal Would a Fully Integrated World Economy Be?
What if we had a huge world economy, even bigger than the world econ-
omy back at the mid-twentieth century,39 with a uniﬁed currency and only
negligible barriers to trade, migration, and capital movements? Would such
an economy be more unequal than the world of today?
We have good examples today of huge integrated economies, at least as
big as the world economy in 1950. One obvious example is the United
States. Japan is another, and the European Union is moving toward be-
coming the third giant integrated economy. How unequal are incomes
within these already globalized economies? Less unequal than in today’s
only partly globalized world economy, where the Gini coeﬃcient of in-
equality in income per capita at international (purchasing power parity)
prices in 1992 was .663.40The Gini for the more integrated U.S. economy, by
contrast, was only .408 in 1997, and that for Japan was only .249. There is
nothing inherently less egalitarian about a large integrated economy com-
pared with our barrier-ﬁlled world.
One might still fear that a truly globalized world would have vast regions
with inferior education and chaotic legal institutions, so that the future
globalized world would be more unequal than the United States or the Eu-
ropean Union today. If so, then the source of that inequality would be poor
government and nondemocracy in those lagging countries, not globaliza-
tion.
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Comment Lant Pritchett
I would be a fool to attempt to summarize what is a masterful review and
summary of the literature on the relationship between globalization and in-
equality, both within and across countries. So, I will limit myself to ﬁve com-
ments that both place the existing paper in context and poke around some
of the puzzles that current events and attitudes raise.
First, I think too much too soon is being made of the relationship between
trade liberalization and inequality. Some have suggested that the rise in in-
equality (and increase in skill diﬀerentials in labor markets) in some coun-
tries undergoing trade liberalization both contradicts the standard model
and, more fundamentally, challenges the desirability of liberalization.
Suppose the wage proﬁle of educational attainment (which is the usual
proxy for “skill diﬀerentials”) represents two eﬀects. One is that educated
people have more skills. The other is that educated people are more likely to
adapt quickly and are more likely to be Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who
reallocate factors across uses in the face of disequilibrium.
Suppose there is a liberalization between a human-capital-rich and a hu-
man-capital-poor country that represents a substantial shift for the human-
capital-poor country. Then there will be two eﬀects on inequality. In both
countries the returns to entrepreneurship will rise, which, if this is positively
associated with education, will steepen the wage-education attainment pro-
ﬁle. This disequilibrium eﬀect should emerge and then gradually go away as
the economy settles down to its new steady state. According to the stan-
dard, simple theory the factor abundance eﬀect should work in diﬀerent di-
rections—raising skill premiums in the skill-rich country and lowering the
skill premiums in the skill-poor country.
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an unambiguous increase in inequality. In the skill-poor country these
eﬀects work in opposite directions so that, depending on their relative mag-
nitudes, inequality could rise, stay the same, or fall in the short to medium
run. Until we have suﬃciently ruled out these “adjustment to disequilibria”
eﬀects on relative wages I would hesitate to say not only that factor abun-
dance theories have been rejected by the data, but that the factor abundance
stories have even been challenged by the data.
Second, the question of globalization and inequality across countries is
often driven by the fact that some of the “nonglobalizers” had extraordi-
narily poor performance. This actually raises something of a puzzle as the
“Harberger triangle” eﬀects are typically too small by an order of magni-
tude to explain the 2 percentage point per annum growth deﬁcit maintained
over thirty or more years implied by the growth rates of the nonglobalizers. 
I think the reconciliation will come in the structure of the instruments
that the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) allowed devel-
oping countries to use. I have examined in detail ﬁve diﬀerent developing
countries’ trade restrictions, and in four of those countries the restrictions
were based on a system of three categories of licenses for imports plus a sys-
tem for licensing foreign exchange (that would come and go). Imports were
classiﬁed into three groups: (a) freely importable, (b) banned, or (c) im-
ported with a license. This requirement of licensing acted as neither a tariﬀ
nor a quota. That is, unlike some types of import rationing in the United
States, this type of licensing scheme did not specify a given quantity of
men’s cotton pants or tons of sugar. Rather, they were discretionary licenses
based on a criterion that granted substantial discretion (e.g., whether they
were “in the national economic interest”).
This meant that the licenses could be made speciﬁc not only to the import
type but also to the use to which the import was to be put and even to the
particular importer (so that public-sector ﬁrms could be preferred over
private-sector ones, established ﬁrms over start-ups—which could not
demonstrate “need”—or bribe payers over non–bribe payers). This aspect
of the discretionary speciﬁcity meant that the usual market clearing condi-
tions for estimating production or welfare losses from restricting imports
did not apply. That is, in order to estimate a Harberger triangle from reduc-
ing import quantities by 10 percent one needs to assume that the lowest val-
ued users (in the consumer surplus sense) were those rationed out. However
with discretionary and speciﬁc import licenses this need not be the case as
high-value private users could be rationed out in favor of low-value, public-
sector ﬁrms. Without either perfect bribery or perfect resale market (which
did not exist in the cases I studied), the Harberger triangle was replaced by
a series of rectangles and the “second order-ness” of production losses from
import restrictions could not be guaranteed.
What does this mean for the current paper? One cannot really compare
272 Peter H. Lindert and Jeﬀrey G. Williamsonthe growth eﬀects of being “protectionist” or a “nonglobalizer” across his-
torical epochs because the instruments used and the intensity with which
they were used vary so widely. In the pre-WWII era there were primarily
tariﬀ-based restrictions (and most “developing” countries were colonies).
In the post-WWII system, developing countries entered the GATT in such
a way that more or less exempted them wholesale from any discipline on the
instruments used to provide import protection (or the intensity of the use of
these instruments). So, while the developed countries moved toward exclu-
sive use of tariﬀs (except, of course, for obvious exceptions such as multi-
ﬁber arrangements) the developing countries used primarily nontariﬀ bar-
riers. This use of nontariﬀ barriers, explicitly allowed to cope with the
balance of payments, combined with the system of “ﬁxed” exchange rates
with periodic revaluations to produce the worst of all worlds. Foreign ex-
change “shortages” from overvalued exchange rates were met with the use
of discretionary import licenses speciﬁc to both use and importer—and
these have the potential to do almost unlimited economic damage. So I
would argue that being a “protectionist” country in the 1970s and 80s has
almost no comparison to the “protectionism” of the 1920s and 30s.
Third, what is it about inequality that is so worrisome? Is it inequality
across countries? Is it inequality within one(‘s own) country? Is it increases
in the volatility of individual incomes (even if cross-sectional inequality
does not increase)? More speciﬁcally, if the Seattle-Quebec protester crowd
were to read and understand this paper, would they stop their antiglobal-
ization agitation? In part, that depends on what one thinks the protestors
are agitated about. I approach this question with a pinch of Bob Dylan’s
“Senators, Congressmen throughout the land, don’t criticize what you can’t
understand,” as I do not really understand what it is that gets the protestors
in the streets.
Here are four conjectures, however, each of which might lead to diﬀerent
reactions:
1. U.S. labor unions: concerns about declining real wages in the United
States, both directly through changes in factor abundance and indirectly via
capital mobility eﬀects that have reallocated economic power (and sharing
of rents) between labor and capital.
2. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): concerns about inequality
across nations, particularly the performance of the poorest.
3. Fear of falling: concerns about the increase in volatility caused by in-
creasing linkages so that white-collar middle managers can lose their jobs
because of ﬁnancial crises in Russia.
4. Hiding costs: concerns that globalization makes it harder to maintain
high levels of social transfers as the costs of measures to transfer resources
from consumer to certain groups of producers (e.g., farmers in Europe) is
made politically more transparent by freer trade.
Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal? 273I think this paper should reassure the NGO crowd. I do not think there
is anything in the evidence to suggest that globalization per se or participa-
tion in globalization has been bad for raising levels of income in the poor-
est countries.
However, after devoting all of my professional life to the problems of
poor countries, I am not convinced that concern about poorer countries is
large enough to generate any political pressure. I personally suspect that the
other three motivations are behind the Seattle antiglobalization movement.
Fourth, there are three puzzles and one possible, partial solution, with re-
spect to reconciling the literature on globalization with individual country
experience. That is, if we imagine that globalization is the process of lead-
ing to deeper integration of ﬁnancial, goods, and labor markets, then vari-
ation in the size of countries should provide some indications about the
likely direction and magnitudes of globalization impacts. First, it is not the
case that larger countries (whether with respect to population or land size),
which have larger markets with or without globalization, have on average
substantially higher levels of income. The countries in the world with
morethan 100 million people are (in order of population size) China, India,
the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, the Russian Federation, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Japan, and Nigeria. This is obviously not compelling, as size
of market depends on outward orientation as well as on intrinsic size, but
large-scale eﬀects in the level of income do not leap oﬀ the page. Second, in
terms of inequality it is also not clear there is any relationship between in-
equality and country size, although here the question for globalization is
whether regions that are not integrated as a single country would have lower
inequality if they were. Finally, one fact that I am very puzzled by is the very
weak forces for convergence even within regions of many developing coun-
tries. Even with urban-rural and cross-regional migration, inequality in per
capita incomes has not decreased in Brazil, India, or China. It seems within
countries there should be rapid and absolute convergence.
The one possible resolution of the size puzzle is that what matters for the
gains from scale is the size of the market over which one can reliably con-
tract—as that determines investments in the concentration of production
and in specialization of assets. If, however, the legal and political systems
contain substantial uncertainty about the appropriability of future proﬁt
streams, then the true size of the market over which a producer can reliably
contract could be orders of magnitude diﬀerent—even for the same size
market because all future ﬂows are so highly discounted.
Fifth, a ﬁnal issue in globalization and inequality is that counteracting
the globalizing forces is a huge increase in the numbers of nation-states.
That is, the post-WWII period has seen an increase from maybe 50 com-
pletely independent, internationally sovereign states to more than 200. I am
currently working with Ricardo Hausmann on a project in which we esti-
mate the growth and income eﬀects of this increasing division of the eco-
274 Peter H. Lindert and Jeﬀrey G. Williamsonnomic space into units that have their own trade policies (not matter how
outwardly oriented), their own currency, their own contract enforcement,
and their own restrictions on labor mobility.
All in all, this is a wonderful paper as it both informs with new facts and
provokes with new thoughts.
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